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This paper analyzes a profit-maximizing private airport with market power in providing aeronautical 
services. Our model implies that airports with ample capacity may voluntarily abstain from abusing their 
market power if non-aeronautical revenues are airports’ main source of income. In this case, a price 
regulation that is confined to the aviation business will be unnecessary from a welfare point of view. 
 





Airports in continental Europe usually face some form of price regulation. This is due 
to the fact that airports are regarded to possess persistent market power in the aviation 
business, which comprises the provision of landing, take-off, gangway and parking 
capacity for aircraft and passengers. In order to avoid that privatized airports can abuse 
this market power and increase prices to achieve excessive returns, raises in the charges 
for aeronautical activities normally have to be approved ex-ante by regulatory 
authorities. On the contrary, charges for non-aeronautical services, that are often 
provided by commercial operators – such as retail, car parking or food & beverage – are 
usually not subject to price regulation. That is because even in the presence of some 
market power in the non-aviation business, airports could be disciplined by potential 
competition. 
In the course of the commercialization and privatization of airports all around the 
world (Graham, 2008; Gillen, 2011), the non-aviation business has become increasingly 
important to airports within the last two decades.2 In the late 1980s, non-aeronautical 
revenues only averaged out at 30% of total airport revenues (Behnke, 2000). Nowadays, 
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2 The term “commercialization” refers to the development of airports from public utilities with a lack of 
commercial management practices to commercial enterprises where a more businesslike management 
philosophy is adopted (Graham, 2008, p. 12). 
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commercial revenues of airports worldwide account for almost half of all airport 
revenues – and at many airports already represent the main source of income (Graham, 
2009; ACI, 2011). Considering this fact, it appears questionable whether airports 
actually have an incentive to take advantage of their market power in the aviation 
business: High aeronautical charges allow for high profits in the aviation business. 
However, lower charges could increase the number of flights and passengers – and, 
hence, increase the demand for and the revenue from non-aeronautical services (Gillen 
and Morrison, 2004, p. 49; Starkie, 2008, p. 60). 
A number of studies have investigated the effects of non-aeronautical revenues on 
airport pricing and the need to regulate aeronautical charges. Starkie (2001) finds that 
airports are unlikely to abuse their market power whenever complementary non-
aeronautical activities exist: Since these activities gain superior locational rents owing 
to their superior location, increases in traffic volumes at an airport will often produce 
significant increases in their profitability. However, the profitability of those 
commercial activities would be negatively affected when aeronautical charges are set 
too high. In contrast, Zhang and Zhang (2003) as well as Oum et al. (2004) show that 
although an unregulated profit-maximizing airport has an incentive to suppress 
aeronautical charges, it would not set them at a socially optimal level, so that a price 
regulation may be necessary. Kratzsch and Sieg (2011) demonstrate that a regulation of 
aeronautical charges may become needless from a welfare point of view if non-
aeronautical revenues exceed a critical, but empirically unknown threshold. 
In this study, we show analytically that profit-maximizing airports with ample 
capacity and market power in the aviation business may not have an incentive to abuse 
their market power if non-aeronautical revenues are an airport’s main source of income. 
In this case, airports may voluntarily accept aviation losses resulting from landing fees 
below the cost-covering level if the induced rise in traffic generates sufficiently high 
non-aeronautical revenues, so that non-aviation profits overcompensate aviation losses. 
If so, a price regulation that focuses on the aviation business will be unnecessary in 
terms of social welfare. 
 
2. The model 
Based on the analysis of Sieg (2010), we consider a profit-maximizing private airport 
that possesses market power in providing aeronautical services. The airport is served by 
an airline (hereafter also referred to as “air carrier”) that is a monopolistic supplier of air 
transport to consumers.3 In order to be allowed to land on the airport and to use the 
airport facilities, the airline has to pay a landing fee. Furthermore, we assume that there 
is ample capacity for both aeronautical and non-aeronautical activities, i.e., the airport is 
prepared to handle additional traffic without facing congestion. 
The demand for tickets is represented by  
 
,= cPDX α−                                                        (1) 
 
where 0>α  is the slope of the linear demand curve and 0>D  the ordinate intercept. 
Ticket demand is equivalent to the number of passengers and higher the lower the ticket 
price cP  demanded by the air carrier. Assuming that the air carrier uses identical 
                                                
3 The model could be easily extended to an N-airline-oligopoly, as in Kratzsch and Sieg (2011). We only 
consider an airline monopoly because there would be no change in the qualitative results of this study. 
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aircraft, and that all aircraft have the same load factor, X  can be measured by the 
number of flights. 
Following Kratzsch and Sieg (2011), we assume that airport revenues consist of 
aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues: Besides the income from aeronautical 
activities, XPa , where Pa > 0  is the landing fee charged to the airline, the airport 
generates income from commercial activities, SX.  Commercial revenues may comprise 
direct income from shops, restaurants, car parks, etc. if these facilities are run by the 
airport itself or concession income if they are run by commercial operators. For 
simplicity, we assume that one commercial product is offered at the airport and each 
passenger buys one unit of this good. Alternatively, the commercial product could be 
consumed in the airport’s competitive hinterland where it is offered at a price that 
equals marginal costs, assumed to be 0=MC , and passengers are free to choose where 
to consume the commercial good. Consequently, the airport possesses no market power 
in the non-aviation business: The airport is not able to set the price of the commercial 
product and, thus, does not earn a non-aeronautical monopoly rent. However, by 
offering the commercial good to consumers, or by renting property to a commercial 
operator that undertakes the provision of the commercial product, the airport earns an 
exogenous locational rent, 0>S . This rent arises because passengers may find it more 
convenient to consume the commercial product at the airport (instead of in the 
hinterland) and, hence, airport users are prepared to pay a premium for retailing or 
property activities at the airport (Forsyth, 2004; Starkie, 2008). As a result, non-
aeronautical revenues amount to SX.  
The airport’s costs consist of fixed costs, FFF << , where F = (4D2 −
(D−αS)2 ) /16α  and αα /8)(= 2SDF + . These costs include capital costs, such as 
depreciation of capital and a normal rate of return on capital. Fixed costs are important 
for airports, therefore they cannot be lower than F.  Very high fixed costs, FF > , result 
in non-profitable airports which are either closed or subsidized by governments. To 
ensure that FF < , we assume that SD α3< , i.e., an exceptionally high willingness to 
pay for flight tickets is excluded. As usual in the literature on airport regulation, we 
further assume that the airport’s costs are perfectly attributable to both aeronautical and 
non-aeronautical activities: A share 1<1/2 ≤λ  in the airport’s costs can be assigned to 
aeronautical activities (the aviation business) whereas the remaining share λ−1  is 
related to commercial activities (the non-aviation business). The lower threshold for λ  
is chosen in order to account for the fact that, in reality, non-aeronautical activities tend 
to generate higher profit margins than aeronautical activities (Oum et al., 2004; ACI, 
2011) because airports’ fixed costs are mainly related to the aviation business. Hence, 
the airport maximizes its profit  
 
( ) FXSPa −⋅+                            (2) 
 
by charging an optimal landing fee aP  to the airline. 
The airline maximizes its profit by demanding an optimal ticket price cP  from the 
passengers. For simplicity, we assume that the only cost accruing to the airline when 
operating a flight is the landing fee. Thus, the air carrier maximizes  
 
 ),()( cc PXcP ⋅−                                                       (3) 
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where the constant total cost per flight c  corresponds to the landing fee paid to the 
airport, i.e., aPc = . 
The timing of events is as follows. The airport has to determine the landing fee in 
advance for the forthcoming flight period. Within that flight period, the airline decides 
what ticket price to charge. Therefore, the game is a sequential game: The airport is the 
first mover and the airline the second mover, and the resulting prices and quantities are 
determined by backward induction. 
 
3. No price regulation 
In the absence of price regulation, the airline determines a ticket price that maximizes 









                                                       (4) 
 






                                                       (5) 
 
The airport anticipates the price decision of the airline and the derived ticket demand. 
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because, by assumption regarding the airport’s costs, FF <  applies. Taking the landing 













                                                    (8) 
 
4. Price regulation 
Subject to price regulation, the airport’s aeronautical charges have to be approved ex-
ante by a regulatory authority in order to prevent the airport from abusing its market 
power in the aviation business. The regulator is assumed to have complete information 
on the airport’s cost structure and to pursue welfare maximization. 
Social welfare W  is defined as the sum of the air carrier’s profit (Pc −Pa )X,  the 
airport’s profit FXSPa −+ )(  and consumer surplus [Pc (Y )+ S]dY − (Pc + S)X0X∫ .  Hence, 
social welfare equals  
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 W = Pc (Y )dY + SX −F0
X
∫ .                                              (9) 
 
Price regulation of airports can be carried out by applying the single-till or the dual-
till approach (Gillen and Niemeier, 2008; Bilotkach et al., 2012). Under single-till 
regulation, aeronautical charges are approved in anticipation of the revenues and costs 
from aeronautical and non-aeronautical activities, and non-aeronautical profits are 
applied to cover deficits in the aviation business. The dual-till approach, on the other 
hand, confines regulation to the aviation business where persistent market power is 
presumed. Although single-till regulation may prove favorable in terms of allocative 
efficiency (Kratzsch and Sieg, 2011; Yang and Zhang, 2011), it appears undesirable in 
terms of productive efficiency (Oum et al., 2004; Assaf and Gillen, 2012). Therefore, 
we restrict our analysis of price regulation to the dual-till approach. 
Under dual-till price regulation, the regulator maximizes social welfare while 
regarding the fact that the airport is not allowed to earn profits AvaΠ  by providing 
aeronautical services in the aviation business. However, with the approved landing fee, 
the airport should be able to achieve cost recovery in the aviation business. Commercial 
activities are not considered by the regulatory authority, the airport is allowed to make 
profits in the non-aviation business and, hence, even an overall profit. Thus, the 







a λ−Π  
 
The regulatory authority will only approve aeronautical charges that do not exceed the 
lowermost landing fee that ensures cost recovery in the aviation business. Consequently, 










≤                                         (10) 
 
where *aP  follows from the airport’s profit maximization under the constraint Pa ≤ Pareg.  





2 FDDX reg αλ−+                                             (11) 
 
flights operated at the airport. Comparing the regulated landing fee to the profit-
maximizing landing fee in the absence of regulation, reveals the important role of an 
airport’s revenue structure. 
 
Proposition 1 A profit-maximizing private airport with ample capacity for aviation 
and non-aviation activities, and a medium level of airport costs, will voluntarily abstain 
from abusing its market power in the aviation business if non-aeronautical revenues are 




     
Pa* =
D−αS
2α   and  Pa
reg = D− D
2 −8αλF
2α ,  
it follows that  
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αSDDFF −−  







                   4(D2 −8αλF) < (D−αS)2,  i.e., 2 D
2 −8αλF
D−αS <1.  
 
Using the assumption *> aPS , it follows from equation (12) that 
reg
aa PP <
* , as stated in 
the proposition.                                                                                                                     
 
If non-aeronautical revenues amount to more than 50% of all airport revenues, a price 
regulation that focuses on the aviation business will be unnecessary from a welfare 
point of view. The profit-maximizing airport will voluntarily abstain from taking 
advantage of its market power in the aviation business. Moreover, the airport will even 
accept aviation losses by charging a landing fee that lies below the cost-covering level 
for the aviation business, regaa PP <
* . This is due to the fact that a landing fee below the 
cost-covering level attracts additional traffic, X(Pa*)− X(Pareg ) = (αS − D2 −8αλF ) / 4  
> 0,  which in turn increases non-aeronautical revenues. As a result, profits by providing 
non-aeronautical services, 0>)(1)/8)(2(= 2 FSSDAvNona λααα −−+Π
− , overcompensate 
aviation losses, 0<)/8)((= 22 FSDAva λαα −−Π , and the airport earns a positive overall 
profit 0>*aΠ . This situation is shown in Figure 1, which presents the airport’s total 
profits aΠ  and the aeronautical profits 
Av
aΠ  as a function of the landing fee Pa.   
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The worldwide trend towards airport commercialization and privatization has 
increased the importance of commercial revenues in the airport business. Within the last 
two decades, the share of non-aeronautical revenues in airports’ total income has 
increased continuously from about 30% to almost 50%. At many airports, commercial 
revenues already represent the main source of income. 
We have shown analytically that this development can have implications for the need 
to regulate airport charges. If non-aeronautical revenues are an airport’s main source of 
income, a profit-maximizing airport may voluntarily abstain from taking advantage of 
its market power in the aviation business: As long as there is ample capacity for 
aeronautical and non-aeronautical activities, and airport costs are neither too high nor 
too low, the profit-maximizing landing fee in the absence of regulation will lie below 
the landing fee that would ensure cost recovery in the aviation business. Hence, a dual-
till price regulation that is confined to the aviation business will be unnecessary in this 
case and could be replaced by a form of ex-post or light-handed regulation, as it is in 
effect at major airports in Australia since 2002. Recent empirical evidence shows that 
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private airports facing light-handed regulation are more efficient than fully and partially 
private airports facing some form of ex-ante price regulation (Assaf and Gillen, 2012). 
In addition, light-handed regulation proves to be able to deter airports effectively from 
abusing their market power – even if airports are local monopolies and possess 





Figure 1: Airport’s total profits aΠ  and airport’s profits out of aviation 
Av
aΠ  as a 
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